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I.

Statement of the Case.

This case involves the enforcement of a personal guaranty of a commercial loan,
and the interpretation of the language in the guaranty agreement defining the scope of the
guaranty obligation.

II.

Course of Proceedings Below.

PlaintifflRespondent Idaho Trust Bank ("ITB") filed its Verified Complaint
against Defendant!Appellant Christian on May 13, 2011. On August 5, 2011, ITB filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment. On August 18, 2011, Christian filed his opposition to ITB's motion.
On September 13, 2011, Christian filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment. In response to
Christian's opposition, ITB withdrew a portion of its motion, converting it to a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Oral argument on both motions was heard on December 22,2011.

Ruling

from the bench, the District Court granted ITB's motion and denied Christian's motion. The
Court issued a written order to the same effect on January 11, 2012.

Christian moved for

reconsideration on January 9, 2011, which motion the District Court denied by its order dated
February 8, 2012. Final judgment was entered on March 7, 2012. Christian filed his Notice of
Appeal on March 15,2012.

III.

Facts.

In December 2006, ITB made a construction loan to Trinity Investments, LLC
("Trinity"), evidenced by a promissory note ("the Note") and secured by a deed of trust ("the
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Deed of Trust") against real property in Garden City, Idaho ultimately developed into twentythree townhouse units. CR 11, 199.
In connection with the loan, Christian executed a Commercial Guaranty in favor
of Plaintiff ("the Guaranty Agreement" or "the Agreement"). CR 14. In its Complaint and its
own motion for summary judgment, ITB asserted that the "Note was personally guaranteed by
Defendant" (CR 6), but this does not accurately describe the terms of the Guaranty Agreement.
The Agreement contains the following relevant language:
1. It provides that the guarantor "guarantees the full and punctual payment and satisfaction
of the Indebtedness of Borrower to Lender[.]" Thus, what is guaranteed is not "the Note"
but the "Indebtedness."
2. "Indebtedness" is a capitalized and defined term in the Guaranty Agreement.

The

Agreement states:
The word 'Indebtedness' as used in this Guaranty means all of
the principal amount outstanding from time to time and at anyone
or more times, accrued unpaid interest thereon and all collection
costs and legal expenses related thereto permitted by law,
reasonable attorneys' fees, arising from any and all debts,
liabilities of every nature or form, now existing or hereafter arising
or acquired, that Borrower individually or collectively or
interchangeably with others, owes or will owe to Lender.
CR 14. Thus, the scope of the guaranty obligation is expressly defined as the amounts "that
Borrower ... owes or will owe to Lender."

The section of the Guaranty Agreement defining

"Indebtedness" refers to the definition as a "limitation on liability." Id. Following the sentence
defining "Indebtedness," the Agreement then provides:
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Indebtedness includes, without limitation, loans, advances, debts,
overdraft indebtedness, credit card indebtedness, lease obligations,
other obligations, and liabilities of Borrower, and any present and
future judgments against Borrower, future advances, loans or
transactions that renew, extend, modifY, refinance, consolidate or
substitute these debts, liabilities and obligations whether:
voluntarily or involuntarily incurred; due or to become due by their
terms or acceleration; absolute or contingent; liquidated or
unliquidated; determined or undetermined; direct or indirect;
primary or secondary in nature or arising from a guaranty or
surety; secured or unsecured; joint or several or joint and several;
evidenced by a negotiable or non negotiable instrument or writing;
originated by Lender or another or others; barred or unenforceable
against Borrower for any reason whatsoever; for any transactions
that may be voidable for any reason (such as infancy, insanity,
ultra vires or otherwise); and originated then reduced or
extinguished and then afterwards increased or reinstated.
Id.
On February 4, 2010, ITB obtained an Order Appointing Receiver for Trinity.
The order expressly authorized the receiver to market and to sell the real property which was the
collateral for the Loan. CR 207. The receiver was authorized to sell any of the townhouse units
without further court approval, if the sales price of a unit was at least 80% of its appraised value.
CR 212-213. The receiver's powers were sought by ITB. CR 217. Christian was not a party to
the receivership proceedings.

Id.

Pursuant to the Order Appointing Receiver sought and

obtained by ITB, the receiver marketed and sold all of the remaining townhouse units owned by
Trinity.

CR 331. None of the sales occurred by foreclosure pursuant to the power of sale

contained in the Deed of Trust. ITB did not seek or obtain a deficiency judgment against Trinity.
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In this action, ITB moved for summary judgment to enforce the Guaranty
Agreement against Christian.

CR 71.

Christian filed his opposition to ITB's motion for

summary judgment, and filed his own motion for summary judgment. CR 194.

The basis of

Christian's motion was that: (1) the Guaranty Agreement's primary definition of the guaranteed
"Indebtedness," including amounts the borrower "owes or will owe," limited his guaranty
obligation; (2) once ITB disposed of the collateral by selling it through a receivership and
thereby lost the ability to obtain a deficiency judgment against Trinity, Trinity no longer "owed"
any amount to ITB; and (3) as a result no further "Indebtedness" existed to be guaranteed under
the Guaranty Agreement.

Christian asserted that other terms in the Guaranty Agreement

purporting to expand the guaranty obligation beyond amounts the borrower "owes or will owe"
to ITB necessarily read the primary definition of "Indebtedness" - the phrase "owes or will
owe" -- out of the Agreement, rendering it ambiguous, and such ambiguity must be construed
against the lender and drafter, ITB. CR 232-342.
At the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the District
Court, commenting from the bench, concluded that the Guaranty Agreement was unambiguous,
and unlimited. The District Court did not issue a written order explaining its ruling. In the
written order granting ITB's motion and denying Christian's motion, the District COUli referred
the parties to its bench comments during the hearing on the parties' cross-motions. CR 374.
However, it necessarily concluded that: (a) despite the definition of the guaranteed
"Indebtedness" as amounts the borrower "owes or will owe" to ITB, the guaranty obligation was
unambiguously unconditional as to any amount borrowed and unpaid, irrespective of whether the
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borrower stilled "owes" any amount to ITB; and (b) the term "owes" did not carry its ordinary
and plain meaning of "subject to an enforceable obligation to repay," but unambiguously meant
borrowed and unpaid, even if the borrower was no longer legally obligated to repay an amount as
a result of ITB' s own actions in disposing of the collateral.
The District Court's reasoning behind those conclusions, to the extent it can be
divined, is reflected in the following comments.

First, the Court asserted that Christian's

argument effectively read out of the Agreement the second part of the definition of
"Indebtedness" (which, according to the Court, made the guaranty obligation unconditional):
THE COURT: And where is it - where is owes defined in?
MR. MARCUS: Owes is not defined in the guaranty agreement,
but it has been defined by the courts in the numerous cases that
we've cited. It has a plain meaning and most of the decisions just
cite Webster's dictionary. But there are numerous decisions that
interpret what - what the tenn owes means, the legal interpretation
of it.
And I think it's pretty clear. I think what owes means is pretty
clear. There's a legally enforceable obligation.
THE COURT: So, in other words, the language that defines
Indebtedness has no meaning?
MR. MARCUS: Now you're talking about the second sentence
under the paragraph Indebtedness?
THE COURT: Yes. It has no meaning[.]
Tr, p. 28, 1. 14 - p. 29, 1. 5.

In fact, the District Court itself apparently thought that the word

"owes" in the definition of "Indebtedness" was meaningless and had no effect on other parts of
the Agreement:
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THE COURT: Well- you know, the problem is that you're trying
to take one word, owes, and create this ambiguity that I don't think
exists and you're ignoring all of the other language that
specifically includes waivers arising from deficiencies, arising
from any other impairment, arising - for example, that are
extinguished, that - I just - I think - you're making a lot about
owes, but I don't think you've read - you haven't read the whole
contract in the context of the contract.
MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, if you interpret it that way, at most it
creates a conflict with the specific definition of Indebtedness.
THE COURT: Well, you're assuming that it's ambiguous and I'm
not so sure that I would find it to be ambiguous MR. MARCUS: NoTHE COURT: -- because I think you're reading a lot into that
word that I don't think exists.
MR. MARCUS: Into Indebtedness?
THE COURT: The word owes.
MR. MARCUS: The word owes?
THE COURT: I don't think it changes anything.
Tr., p. 42, 1. _ - p. 43, 1. 21.
MR. MARCUS: Well, Your Honor, I agree that the whole contract
should be read, but it is possible to read the whole contract and and reach the conclusion that, well, what you've got are two
provisions that conflict with each other.
THE COURT: But there is no conflict. This makes it clear there
is no conflict.
MR. MARCUS: Well, it's - there's no conflict if you ignore the
meaning of owes.
THE COURT: No, I'm sorry. The meaning of owes, you're
simply wrong. The cases that you cite to are distinguishable from
what we have here. Everything that we look at depends on what
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the contract says and for you to - for the definition of owes to be
what you say it is, that provision I read would have no meaning.
MR. MARCUS: Does the provision that you just read to me
define the term owes?
THE COURT: It doesn't have to define the term owes. I'm
simply telling you I don't think that your argument makes sense.
Tr., p. 46, 1. 7 - p. 47, 1. 3.
Eventually, the District Court revealed that, in its view, the intent and purpose of
any guaranty was to ensure that the lender is paid, without regard to the actual definition of the
guaranty obligation. In doing so the Court essentially cast aside any pretense of actually reading
and interpreting the definition ofthe guaranty obligation in the agreement before it. It stated:
I'm sorry, the borrower had - has an indebtedness. Whether they
can collect against the bOlTower is a different issue. And a
guaranty - the purpose -- this is the reason that I, for one, would
never sign a personal guaranty. The purpose of a personal
guaranty is to insure that the lender is paid in the event that the
borrower can't pay for whatever reason. It doesn't make any
difference what the reason is that the debtor can't pay. That's - the
guarantor has a separate contract.
And I do agree with you, these underlying agreements that exist
are really somewhat ilTelevant. But the fact of the matter is that
the purpose behind the guaranty is to do exactly what's happening
here.
Tr., p. 48, 1. 24 -- p. 49, 1. 14. In other words, apparently, in the District Court's
view it is impossible for a guaranty agreement ever to be ambiguous, because the underlying
general purpose and intent of such an agreement is that the lender will always be able to recover
under any circumstances.
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The Court then commented that it had seen many guaranty agreements in the
previous year that were "almost word for word what this one is." The relevance of this was not
explained. It observed that Christian's argument was "novel." The relevance of this also was
not explained. In summarizing its decision the Court seems to have assumed, generally, that
commercial guaranty agreement are "all encompassing" and have no limits (despite the fact that
the Agreement here refers to its own definition of the guaranteed "Indebtedness" as a "limitation
on liability"):
I think the lenders have gotten very good - and I'm just going to
make a general comment before I look at this language - have
gotten very good at writing these guarantees to make them as all
encompassing as possible. The courts have enforced that.
In this case the guaranty provides, and I don't think there's any
argument about this language. The language that's at issue has to
do with what's an Indebtedness. I'm going to talk about that. But
here it's very clear that in looking at the language of the guaranty
that it's an unconditional guaranty and that there is no requirement
that the lender proceed against the collateral or proceed against the
debtor before proceeding against the guarantor.
So the issue here - and I will note that the Court of Appeals has
gone so far as to say that a - when the guaranty is unconditional,
the guarantor cannot imply limitations on the lender's right to
recover. It's the plain and unambiguous terms that dictate the
intent of the parties and the obligations.
So the definition of the Indebtedness - and as I have said, I think
the parties have focused only on the definition of Indebtedness, but
I do believe that to the extent that Mr. Christian is arguing that
somehow the word owes is ambiguous - and as I indicated to you,
Mr. Marcus, I've read those cases and I don't believe that they
stand for the proposition that the word owes has the meaning that
you suggest in the - as long as it's here in the presence of the
language that appears here.
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And I threw out a couple of examples, but I could probablY throw
out quite a few more because I think when you read the totality of
this guaranty, they make it clear that it is not the liability of the the present liability of the debtor that determines whether the
guarantor is still liable. It's not the present liability. It refers to that the guarantor is waiving some of these rights and defenses.
The - the guarantor's waiving a defense based on the antideficiency law. And of course, there's case law that says the antideficiency law does not extend to the guarantor. It is there only for
the debtor. And, as I pointed out, I think it's important to show
that in - in - in the - if there is, in fact, a bankruptcy and there's a
full discharge of the debtor, this language makes it clear that the
indebtedness shall be considered unpaid for the purposes of the
enforcement of the guaranty.
And if you go back to the term Indebtedness, it is extreme - it is an
extremely broad definition of Indebtedness and includes more than
just loans. It has a number of things that it covers. And I don't
want to go through and read them because they've already people have already read them.
But it also makes clear that even if - even if it's barred or
unenforceable against the borrower for any reason whatsoever, it
still survives. If there's any transactions that could be voidable,
normally those things, and they give examples like infancy,
insanity, ultra-vires or otherwise, even if that were to occur, even if
the debtor would still have those defenses, the guarantor would
still be - it would still be considered an Indebtedness for the
purpose of this guaranty and that's what I think that waiver
language deals with.
So when I look at this, it appears to me that this is an extremely
broad guaranty and I don't find a basis upon which the guarantor
can escape liability.

****
So I find that the guaranty contrary to argument is unambiguous.
It is clear and unambiguous and that Christian's argument that he
was effectively discharged fails.
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Tr., p. 54, 1. 4 - p. 57,1. 15. At no point did the Court indicate specifically what it thought the
meaning of "owes or will owe" must be in order to make the Agreement unambiguous.

IV.

Issues Presented on Appeal.
1.

Did the District COUli err in concluding that the Guaranty

Agreement drafted by ITB was unambiguous?
2.

Did the District Court err in concluding as a matter of law that the

definition of the guaranteed "Indebtedness" under the Guaranty Agreement drafted by ITB was
unambiguously unconditional?
3.

Did the District COUli err by construing an ambiguous guaranty

agreement in favor of the lender which drafted it and against the guarantor?
4.

Did the District Court err in failing to conclude that ITB's

disposition of its collateral by other than statutory nonjudicial foreclosure left no amount "owed"
by ITB's borrower, such that no "Indebtedness" remained for Clu'istian to guaranty?
5.

Did the District Court err in granting ITB's motion for partial

summary judgment and denying Christian's motion for summary judgment?

V.

Argument.
A.

Standard of Review.

This Court reviews a motion for summary judgment using the same standard
employed by the district court in deciding the motion. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #25, 149
Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable
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persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence.
Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No.2. 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996).
The Supreme Court freely reviews questions of law. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65
P.3d 525,528 (2003). Whether a contract term is ambiguous is an issue oflaw. Cannon v. Perry,
144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007). "A contract term is ambiguous when there are
two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical," i.e., it contains
absurdities or contradictions, Potlatch Educ. Ass'n & Doug Richards v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148
Idaho 630, 633 (2010); Swanson v. Beco Construction Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63 (2008), or where
the parties' intent "cannot be determined clearly from the language of the contract". George v.
Univ. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 30, 37 (1991).

Words in a contract are to be given their plain and

ordinary meaning, Swanson v. Beco Construction Co., supra; Roeder Mining Inc. v. Johnson,
118 Idaho 96, 97 (1990).
B.

Standards applicable to guaranty agreements.

"A guarantor, like a surety, has been held to be a favorite of the law and his
liability is not to be extended by implication beyond the express limits or terms of the
instrument, or its plain intent." Industrial Investment Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 233 (1979).
"Guaranty instruments are strictly construed. A guarantor's obligations are limited
to those expressly recited in the guaranty instrument." CIT Fin. Servs. v. Herb's Indoor RV
Ctr., 118 Idaho 185,191 (Ct. App. 1990).
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Similar to the rule regarding insurance policies, the burden is on the lender to use
clear and precise language if it wishes to expand the scope of the guaranty. See Arreguin v.
Farmers Insurance Co., 145, Idaho 459, 461 (2008). Thus, if the Court engages in interpretation
of a guaranty agreement because it is ambiguous, "it must be interpreted in favor of the
guarantor." The Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 553 (2007).

c.

The long-established plain meaning of
"owes" is to be subject to a binding
obligation to pay, and the Guaranty
Agreement provides no other meaning in
the definition of the guaranteed
"Indebtedness" .

The "Indebtedness" which is the subject of the guaranty is expressly defined in
the Guaranty Agreement as those amounts that the borrower "owes or will owe" to ITB. ITB
resolutely refused during proceedings below to directly address the plain meaning of the word
"owes."J The District Comi likewise ignored the issue, focusing instead on parts of the Guaranty
Agreement other than the primary definition of the guaranty obligation, i.e., the "Indebtedness."
However, over the years several authorities have held in a variety of contexts that the word
"owes" plainly (in other words, unambiguously) means "subject to an enforceable obligation to
pay."

Indeed, throughout its briefing below ITB asserted variously (without reference to the actual language of
the Guaranty Agreement) that Christian guarantied or is obligated for "the loan", "all debt incurred by Trinity but
not paid by Trinity", "any obligation/debt incurred by the borrower", "all of borrower's indebtedness under the
promissory note", "all amounts that Trinity incurred", and, vaguely, "the balance". CR 245,248,251,258. ITB
apparently wished the guaranty obligation to be anything but what is actually defined in the Guaranty Agreement to
be - the "Indebtedness," i.e., amounts the borrower "owes or will owe Lender."
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Black's Law Dictionary, (5 th Ed. 1979) at 996, defines "owe" as follows: "To
be bound to do or omit something, especially to pay a debt.,,2 In other words, if a debtor is no
longer bound or obligated to pay a debt (as where a creditor has lost the ability to enforce an
instrument), the debt is no longer "effective" or "outstanding" and the debtor no longer "owes"
the creditor anything.
A case similar to this one is Salitan v. Magnus, 62 N.J. Super. 323, 162 A.2d 883
(N.J. Super., App. Div. 1960).

There, the defendants guaranteed all obligations which the

borrower "may at any time owe" to the plaintiff. The borrower filed for bankruptcy protection,
and the amounts owed to the plaintiff as of the time of the bankruptcy filing were eventually paid
through the liquidation of the borrower's assets. However, the plaintiff sought to collect from
the defendant guarantor the interest that would have accrued on the debt from the date of the
bankruptcy filing forward.

Rejecting this claim, the court stated that "although defendants'

liability on the contract of guaranty is direct and unconditional in the sense that it was
enforceable by plaintiffs without the necessity of first obtaining a judgment against the
[borrower], their obligation is not independent." This was so because the guarantor defendants
"guaranteed the payment only of such debts as the [borrower] might at any time 'owe' to
plaintiffs." 162 A.2d at 889. Thus, the court concluded, "[t]here can be no doubt that, in the
circumstances of this case, the existence of a subsisting corporate debt to plaintiffs is essential to

See also http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/owe ("to be under obligation to payor repay in
return
for
something
received");
http://dictionary.reference.comibrowse/owe
("to be under obligation to payor repay"). Likewise, Black's defines "outstanding" as "constituting an effective
obligation." Black's Law Dictionary, supra.
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a suit on the guaranty." Id. Because the borrower was held in its bankruptcy case not to be
obligated to the plaintiff for post-petition interest, the court concluded, "we hold that plaintiffs
have proved no subsisting corporate liability to them and hence no right to recover under the
guaranty." Id. at 891.
The decision in Salitan was relied upon to dispose of the same issue by the Texas
Court of Appeals in Western Bank v. Carline, 757 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. Ap. 1988). There, the
cOUli concluded that it was reasonable to interpret the guaranty agreement not to obligate the
guarantors to pay post-petition interest and fees "because those sums can never be charged
against the principal, Tex-La," since the guarantors only "bound themselves to pay 'any and all
indebtedness ... which Tex-La . .. may now or may at any time hereafter owe ... '" 757 S.W.2d
at 114.
Another similar case is Seymour v. Weinberg, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227 (Ct.
App. 2005). There, the personal guaranty agreement provided that it covered "the indebtedness
evidenced by a celiain promissory note" in the amount of $95,000, but then stated that the
"indebtedness includes all indebtedness and all obligations owing now or in the future of
Creditor by Debtor[.]" The lender attempted to enforce the personal guaranty with respect to a
debt of the borrower unrelated to the original $95,000 note. The Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected the lender's argument that the second clause expanded the initial definition of what was
guaranteed, and concluded that the second clause "irreconcilably conflicts" with the first
definition of the guaranteed amount. As a result, the court reasoned, the "defendant's clearly
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expressed or manifested intent to guarantee any future loans is absent because of the ambiguity
in the language of the Guaranty." Because the guarantor could not be liable beyond the express
terms of the guaranty agreement, and such liability "cannot be implied from language that fails to
clearly manifest an intention to assume another's debt," the court concluded that it was
unnecessary to resolve the ambiguity and the guaranty was unenforceable as a matter of law.
Courts have consistently interpreted the word "owes" in other contexts as well. In
Cohen v. Disner, 36 Cal. App. 4th 855, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), the court
construed a section of the California Civil Code dealing with dishonored checks and imposing
liability for "the amount owing upon" the dishonored instrument. The court concluded that
"[t]he plain meaning of 'to owe' is 'to be under obligation to payor repay in return for
something received.'" 42 Cal. Rptr.2d at 785 (quoting Websters' New Int'l Diet. (3d ed. 1976),
p. 1612). The court then stated: "By acknowledging there must be an enforceable obligation to
pay, section 1719 echoes the UCC, which precludes recovery where the payee has 'no right to
enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument.' ... If the maker has no enforceable
obligation to pay a dishonored check, there is no amount 'owing upon that check' under the plain
language of section 1719. . . Had the Legislature intended section 1719 to be a strict liability
statute, it would have imposed liability for 'the amount written upon that check' rather than 'the
amount owing upon that check.'" Id. at 785-6.
Similarly, in In re Leggett, 335 B.R. 227 (N.D. Ga. 2005), a creditor sought a
ruling that a debtor was ineligible for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because his debts were too great.
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The Court reviewed the language of 11 U.S .C. § 109( e), which provides in pertinent part that
"[ 0 ]nly

an individual debtor with regular income that owes" certain "debts" below a certain

amount may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Court began by

observing that eligibility for Chapter 13 "thus depends on the amount of debts that the debtor
owes on the date of filing the petition."

335 B.R. at 230.

The Court continued:

"The

Bankruptcy Code expressly defines 'debt' as 'liability on a claim,' ... and the plain meaning of
'owe' is 'to be under an obligation to pay.'" Id. (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Diet. 1612
(Merriam-Webster 1993)).

It concluded: "The Debtor's eligibility in this case, therefore,

depends on whether the Debtor owed [the creditor] a debt on the filing date, that is, whether he
was liable on [the creditor's] claim. Id.
In Harrison v. Mason, 191 So. 916 (Ala. 1939), the issue was whether the
defendant had provided to the plaintiff a written reaffirmation of a debt sufficient to constitute a
new promise re-struiing the limitations. There, the court stated: "The word 'owes' is used in the
written acknowledgement here in question," and then concluded from a review of other
authorities that "the word 'owes' is defined as meaning 'obligated or bound to pay.'" 191 So. at
919. In one decision cited by the cOUli in Harrison, the court stated: "To say that one owes a
debt means simply that he is obliged or bound to pay, and that may be said as well of an
immature as of an overdue obligation." McDuffie v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 59 So. 567, 568 (Ala.
1912). See also Miller v. Jones, 137 Neb. 605, 609, 290 N.W. 467 (1940) (quoting McDuffie
with approval).
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In Baietto v. Baietto, 319 Ill. App. 8; 48 N.E.2d 726 (1943), where the issue was
whether a writing by a deceased father, using the word "owe," was sufficient to support his sons'
claim against his estate for work they performed, the court stated: "The word 'owe,' as used by
the father also has a definite meaning. Worcester's Comprehensive Dictionary describes it as 'to
be bound to pay, or to pay to or to be indebted to.' Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines'
'owe,' 'to have an obligation by someone, on account of something done, or received; to be
indebted to, as to owe the grocer for supplies or a laborer for services. ", 48 N.E.2d at 728.
Most recently, in the context of insurance, a court applying the term "justly
owing" in a statute related to proofs of claim" stated: "We interpret 'justly owing' to mean the
amount Midland would have been obligated to pay its Major Policyholder had it remained
solvent." Matter of Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 16 N.y'3d 536; 947 N.E.2d 1174 (Ct. App.
N.Y. 2011).
Thus, courts have long and consistently held that the word "owes" plainly means
subject to an enforceable obligation to pay. Christian's interpretation of the term, and of the
definition of the term "Indebtedness" in the Guaranty Agreement, is entirely reasonable. Even if
the other terms relied upon by ITB and the District Court can be interpreted to provide for an
unconditional guaranty obligation, the plain meaning of the term "owes or will owe" necessarily
renders the Agreement ambiguous.
The fact that guarantor's liability is limited is expressly recognized in the second
paragraph of the section of the Guaranty Agreement entitled "INDEBTEDNESS". The first
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sentence of this paragraph refers to the definition of "Indebtedness" as a "limitation on
liability.,,3 Limiting the guarantor's liability to what the borrower is legally obligated to pay to

the lender is consistent with the express reference to the definition of "Indebtedness" as a
"limitation on liability."

Although the guarantor's obligation to pay the "Indebtedness" is

unlimited (as to amount), the Guarantor's liability is limited to the "Indebtedness", i.e. what the

borrower "owes" (is legally obligated to pay).
ITB easily could have drafted the Guaranty Agreement to provide that what is
guaranteed is the remaining balance of the Note, irrespective of whether Trinity still "owes" that
amount. 4 Instead, ITB chose to include the limitation that Defendant guaranteed only what the
borrower "owes or will owe" to ITB.

Because ITB disposed of the collateral by obtaining the

appointment of a receiver for that purpose, instead of foreclosing on the Deed of Trust, it has no
right to obtain a deficiency judgment against Trinity and there is no remaining amount that
Trinity "owes" to ITB.5

The limitation on the guarantor's liability that appears above this sentence is the limitation of
"Indebtedness" to the amounts that the bon·ower "owes or will owe Lender".
4

While the Guaranty Agreement authorizes ITB to "alter, compromise, renew, extend, accelerate or
otherwise change one or more times the time for payment or other terms of the Indebtedness" without lessening
liability under the guaranty, it pointedly does not expressly authorize ITB to take an act which discharges the
borrower offurther obligation under the Note and yet maintain the guaranty liability. CR 14. The Agreement does
not anywhere clearly state that, rather than being limited to the amount Trinity "owes" (remains legally obligated to
pay), the guaranty obligation extends to amounts from which Trinity has been discharged or relieved by ITB's own
action.

See also First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Scherle, 356 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1984), where
the court held that the lender, having made a full credit bid for the collateral at the sheriff's sale upon foreclosure of
a mortgage granted by the borrower, could not pursue related personal guarantees.
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D.

The District Court's reliance on other
terms in the Guaranty Agreement to
provide for an unconditional guaranty
obligation directly conflict with the plain
meaning of "owes," creating ambiguity.

The District Court read the first and second sentence of the section in the
Guaranty Agreement entitled "INDEBTEDNESS" as providing, in essence, as follows:
"Indebtedness" means all amounts Borrower owes or will
owe Lender. "Indebtedness" includes amounts incurred by
BOlTower that are barred or unenforceable against
Borrower for any reason whatsoever.
This interpretation creates a contradiction with the plain meaning of the first
sentence which contains the primary definition of the guaranty. In this situation courts have
rejected the secondary conflicting definition.
LEXIS 1227 eCt. App. 2005).

See Seymour v. Weinberg, 2005 Mich. App.

In Seymour the Court rejected the secondary conflicting

definition, reasoning that the resulting contradiction made it impossible to conclude that the
guarantor intended to guarantee the additional amount claimed to be included in the secondary
conflicting definition. The same result should be reached here.
The phrase relied upon by ITB and the District Court is not included in the initial
definition of "Indebtedness," but in a following sentence listing examples of items which may
constitute an "Indebtedness." At best, this language is in irreconcilable conflict with the express
limitation in the primary definition of "Indebtedness" to amounts the borrower "owes or will
owe" to ITB. It is impossible to simultaneously define "Indebtedness" as limited to the amount
the borrower "owes", i.e., is legally obligated to pay, and also to include an amount which the
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borrower is not legally obligated to pay, i.e., amounts "barred or unenforceable ... for any
reason whatsoever," particularly where the discharge of Trinity's obligation resulted from ITB' s
own choice to dispose of the collateral in a manner which foreclosed it from further enforcing the
Note against Trinity. These terms cannot reasonably be harmonized in a fashion favorable to
ITB, rendering the Guaranty at least ambiguous. "A contract term is ambiguous when there are
two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical." Potlatch Educ. Ass'n &
Doug Richards v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 633 (2010); see also Madrid v. Roth, 134
Idaho 802, 806 (Ct. App. 2000) (contract is ambiguous if its terms are "contradictory to and
inconsistent with" each other); Roeder Mining, Inc. v. Johnson, 118 Idaho 96, 97 (1990)
(contract is ambiguous if it "contains absurdities or contradictions,,).6 Words in a contract are to
be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63
(2008). 7 In addition, a contract should not be construed in manner which renders one of its terms
a nullity. Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass'n v. Aune, 124 Idaho 132, 137 (1993). Reliance on the
terms resorted to by ITB and the District Court requires reading the plain term "owes or will
owe" out of the Agreement, an improper result. However, the District Court's comments make
clear this is exactly what it did. This was error. Because the plain meaning of "owes or will
owe" defining "Indebtedness at worst directly conflicts with the examples of items of
6

Moreover, "[a]n agreement that is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties cannot be
ascertained is unenforceable, and courts are left with no choice but to leave the parties as they found them." Griffith
v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 737 (2007). Particularly in the case of a lender-drafted guamnty
agreement which is subject to strict construction, it is not the court's role to clarifY uncertainty once found, but the
court must construe it against the lender and drafter. The Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, supra.

The Guaranty Agreement contains no expression of any intent to give "owes or will owe" a technical
meaning at odds with its widely acknowledged plain meaning. Indeed, in the context of a financial instrument, it is
difficult to see how "owes or will owe" could ever be read otherwise.
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"Indebtedness" in the next sentence of the Agreement, the District Court should have found that
the Agreement is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the guarantor. The Vanderford
Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 553 (2007).
The second sentence can be construed in such a way that it does not contradict the
primary definition of "Indebtedness" contained in the first sentence. It appears that this second
sentence addresses the situation where an amount that is owed by the Borrower initially later
becomes barred or unenforceable, and then is revived by a subsequent judgment or agreement.
The second sentence provides that a revived substituted debt is guaranteed even though the initial
debt may have been barred or unenforceable. The second sentence provides, in essence, that:
"Indebtedness" includes any present or future judgments against Borrower, future
advances, loans or transactions that renew, extend, modify, refinance, consolidate
or substitute these debts, liabilities and obligations whether [these debts,
liabilities and obligations that are renewed, extended, modified, refinanced,
consolidated, or substituted, are] barred or unenforceable against BOlTower for
any reason whatsoever.
This is a more reasonable interpretation because the clause that is modified appears in closer
proximity to the modifying phrase than that suggested by the Court and because it harmonizes
with, and doesn't conflict with, the plain meaning of "owes." If the second sentence admits of
two reasonable interpretations it is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous it must be interpreted in favor
of the guarantor. The District Court erred in interpreting this ambiguous provision in favor of
the ITB.
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The District Court stated the principle that the Guaranty Agreement's language
must be read in its entirety and effect given to all terms if possible, and the Court then concluded
that Defendant's reliance on the plain meaning of the term "owes or will owe" worked to nullify
other portions of the Agreement. As discussed above, this is not necessarily the case. Equally
importantly, however, the Court's reliance on other parts of the Agreement in a manner which
effectively deletes the term "owes or will owe" from the definition of the guaranty liability, and
renders unlimited a guaranty liability which is expressly stated to be limited, violates the very
same principle. As a result, the Agreement is necessarily ambiguous and must be construed in
favor of the guarantor.
E.

Various other parts of the Guaranty
Agreement relied upon by the District
Court are irrelevant, as they depend on
the
present
existence
of
an
"Indebtedness" and do not change the
defined scope of the guaranty obligation.

The District Court relied heavily on other portions of the Guaranty Agreement, to
the exclusion of the primary definition of the guaranteed "Indebtedness," to determine that the
guaranty obligation unambiguously includes the balance of the Note, even though no longer
"owed" by Trinity. CR 14-15. However, those other terms depend on the present existence of
an "Indebtedness," i.e., an amount the borrower presently "owes" and remains legally obligated
to pay. If no "Indebtedness" exists, they are irrelevant:
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1.

The provision that the Guaranty Agreement "will continue in full force

until all the Indebtedness ... shall have been fully and finally paid and satisfied" is irrelevant
where no Indebtedness exists to be paid.
2.

The waiver of the right to require the Lender "to resort for payment or

proceed directly or at once against any other person, including Borrower" or to "pursue any other
remedy within Lender's power" is irrelevant where there is no remaining Indebtedness to be
guaranteed, because at that point no need exists for the guarantor to assert any such right.
3.

The District Court concluded that the second paragraph in the section of

the Agreement entitled "Guarantor's Waivers" precludes the interpretation that the guarantor's
liability (i.e. the "Indebtedness") is limited to the amount that the borrower is legally obligated to
pay. That paragraph provides that:
Guarantor also waives any and all rights or defenses based
on suretyship or impairment of collateral including, but not
limited to, any rights or defenses arising by reason of (A)
any "one action" or "anti deficiency" law "one action" or
"anti deficiency" law or any other law which may prevent
Lender from bringing any action, including a claim for
deficiency, against Guarantor before or after Lenders
commencement or completion of any foreclosure action,
either judicially or by exercise of a power of sale[.]
The waiver of "defenses based on suretyship or impairment of collateral" is irrelevant where no
Indebtedness remains to be guaranteed, because at that point no need exists for the guarantor to
assert any such defenses. The District Court apparently concluded that reliance on the limited
guaranty obligation defined in the Agreement (i.e. the amount that the borrower "owes or will
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owe" to ITB) is a right or defense "based on" or "arising by reason of' Idaho's one action or
anti-deficiency statute. In fact, the limitation of the guarantor's liability is a right that arises by
reason of the Agreement's definition of that liability. It does not arise by reason of the antideficiency or single action statute; although the application of the statute may create the
circumstance that permits exercise of the right. The Agreement's definition of the guarantor's
liability creates a right in the guarantor to be free of liability that is beyond the defined limit.
The waiver section of the Agreement does not purport to waive the limitation of the guaranty
liability that is defined in the first and second sections ofthe Agreement. 8
4.

The provision authorizing the Lender to "enforce this Guaranty even when

Lender has not exhausted Lender's remedies against anyone else obligated to pay the
Indebtedness or against any collateral securing the Indebtedness" is irrelevant where no
Indebtedness remains to be guaranteed.
5.

The District Court also apparently reasoned that the amounts the borrower

"owes or will owe" to ITB includes amounts not owed by the borrower, based on the statement
in the first sentence of the Guaranty Agreement that the guaranty is absolute and unconditional.
In fact, the first sentence states only that the guarantor absolutely and unconditionally guaranties
payment of the "Indebtedness." The language the Court relied upon is relevant only if there

Of course, if the waiver provisions are interpreted as a waiver of a right created in another section of the Agreement an
obvious ambiguity is created - which must be construed against the Bank and not the Guarantor.
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remains "Indebtedness," as it is defined. It does not state that the Guarantor absolutely and
unconditionally guaranties payment of all amounts loaned. 9
6.

The Court relied on the following provision in the Guaranty Agreement to

conclude that the guaranty liability extends to loan amounts that are not owed by the Borrower:
If payment is made ... on the Indebtedness and thereafter
Lender is forced to remit the amount of that payment to
Borrower's trustee in bankruptcy ... the Indebtedness shall
be considered unpaid for the purpose of the enforcement of
their Guaranty.
This provision appears in the section entitled "Guarantors Waivers." It is not part of the section
which defines the guaranteed "Indebtedness."

Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the

interpretation that the guaranty liability is limited to the amounts that the borrower is legally
obligated to pay to ITB. It acknowledges the defined term "Indebtedness" and simply states that
the amount that the Borrower is legally obligated to pay is not reduced by a payment that is
diverted to a trustee in bankruptcy. The significance of this provision is the parties' agreement
that the Lender's claim in bankruptcy should not be reduced by a payment that turns out to be a
preference under the bankruptcy law and confiscated by the trustee. It does not state that the
'Indebtedness" of the borrower, and thus the guarantor's liability, would not be affected by the
discharge of the borrower in bankruptcy. To the extent it can be interpreted otherwise, it directly
conflicts with the plain definition of "Indebtedness," creating an ambiguity.

9
The Court also relied in its comments from the bench on the presumed broad "purpose of a guaranty." This is not the
guiding principle for interpreting a guaranty. If anything the rule that guaranties must be construed strictly in favor of the
guarantor indicates that guaranties are to be read narrowly, not broadly.
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Thus, contrary to the District Court's asseliion, Christian did not ignore most of
the language of the Guaranty Agreement. Rather, the language relied upon by ITB and the
District Court is irrelevant, and either does not affect the expressly defined scope of the guaranty
obligation or can only reasonably harmonized in a manner which does not expand the scope of
the obligation beyond its plain meaning. If it cannot be harmonized, it renders the Agreement
unambiguous.
F.

Because ITB chose to dispose of its collateral by
receivership rather than through a nonjudicial
foreclosure, it cannot obtain a deficiency
judgment against its borrower, Trinity, and the
borrower has no further enforceable obligation
to ITB.

Idaho's deed of trust deficiency statute states, in pertinent part:
At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of trust,
as hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be sought for the
balance due upon the obligation for which such deed of trust was
given as security, and in such action the plaintiff shall set forth in
his complaint the entire amount of indebtedness which was secured
by such deed of trust and the amount for which the same was sold
and the fair market value at the date of sale, together with interest
from such date of sale, costs of sale and attorney's fees.
Idaho Code § 45-1512. Additionally, I.C. § 45-1503(1) provides in pertinent part:
If any obligation secured by a trust deed is breached, the
beneficiary may not institute a judicial action against the grantor or
his successor in interest to enforce an obligation owed by the
grantor or his successor in interest unless:
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(a) The trust deed has been foreclosed by advertisement and sale
in the manner provided in this chapter and the judicial action is
brought pursuant to section 45-1512, Idaho Code; or
(b) The action is one for foreclosure as provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property; or
(c) The beneficiary's interest in the property covered by the trust
deed is substantially valueless as defined in subsection (2) of this
section lO , in which case the beneficiary may bring an action against
the grantor or his successor in interest to enforce the obligation
owed by grantor or his successor in interest without first resorting
to the security; or
(d) The action is one excluded from the meaning of "action"
under the provisions of section 6-101 (3), Idaho Code."
Thus, a deficiency judgment may be obtained by a creditor against a borrower
under a promissory note secured by a deed of trust only after foreclosure and sale of real
property pursuant to the deed of trust. First Interstate Bank v. Eisenbarth, 123 Idaho 895, 898
(Ct. App. 1993) ("[U]nder I.C. § 45-1503 ... no action can be maintained for the recovery on a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust, unless the action is coupled with an action to
foreclose the deed of trust, except where it is shown that the security has become substantially
valueless."). A creditor holding a deed of trust and disposing of its collateral other than by
foreclosure pursuant to the deed of trust cannot obtain a deficiency judgment against its debtor.

10

That the creditor may not dispose of the collateral outside of a foreclosure and then pursue action on the
balance of the note, using the argument that the collateral has been rendered "substantially valueless," is made clear
by I.e. § 45-1503(2), which provides that '''substantially valueless' means that the beneficiary's interest in the
propelty covered by the trust deed has become valueless through no fault of the beneficimy[.]"
II

I.e. § 6-101 (3) excludes various acts from the definition of an "action" for the purpose of the "one-action
rule," but specifically does not exclude an action for "the collection of the debt or enforcement of the obligation or
realization of the collateral securing the debt or other obligation." I.e. § 6-101(3)(m).
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Id. As a consequence, the promissory note secured by the deed of trust has no more "binding
force" and the borrower's remaining obligation is effectively discharged.
Here, ITB chose not to foreclose on the Deed of Trust, instead seeking the
appointment of a receiver for the specific purpose of marketing and selling the collateral.
Therefore, its borrower Trinity is no longer obligated to it. I.C. §45-1503(l); First Interstate
Bank v. Eisenbarth, supra. ITB admitted this fact its briefing below. See Plaintiff's Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10 (admitting that "Plaintiff can no longer
seek collection of that money because of the provision of the anti-deficiency statute that limit
[sic] a borrower's liability"); see also Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 9 ("The creditor has chosen not
to enforce its rights for recovery against the borrower and/or collateral in such a way that the
creditor has no more legal rights against the borrower ... " ); CR 251, 252. 12
ITB argued below that Christian as a guarantor "cannot seek protection under the
Anti-Deficiency Statute." The District Court appears to have relied in part on that argument.
Christian does not seek any such "protection," but the application of Idaho Code § 45-1503 and
§45-1512 does impact whether the borrower, Trinity, "owes" any remaining amount to ITB, and
thus whether there remains any "Indebtedness" for Christian to guaranty. This is a direct result
ofITB's own definition of the scope of the guaranty, the "Indebtedness." None of the decisions
cited by ITB to the District COUli contain any indication that the guaranty agreement at issue
12

While admitting that it had "no more legal rights" against Trinity because it could no longer obtain a
deficiency judgment against Trinity, ITB simultaneously asserted to the District Court that "Trinity owes money to
Plaintiff, but Plaintiff can no longer seek collection of that money because of the provision of the anti-deficiency
statute that limits [sic] a borrower's liability[.]" CR 251,252. In other words, ITB claimed that the borrower "owes
money to [it]," while simultaneously having no "liability" to it.
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defined the guarantor's obligation as limited to an "Indebtedness" defined to mean only those
amounts the borrower "owes." They are ilTelevant to this case.
In the decision ITB relied primarily on, First Sec. Bank ond. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho
172 (1988),

the court rejected the guarantor's argument that direct recourse to the anti-

deficiency laws should be extended to guarantors on public policy grounds. The same issue is
not implicated in this case.

Defendant does not seek direct recourse to the anti-deficiency

defense. The statutes are relevant only insofar as they caused the borrower's liability to ITB to
be extinguished as a result of its choice in disposing of the collateral, and the Guaranty
Agreement expressly limits the guaranty obligation to those amounts which the borrower still
"owes or will owe" to ITB i.e., those amounts for which it remains liable to ITB. Gaige and
cases like it would be relevant only if ITB had drafted the Guaranty Agreement to define the
guaranty obligation in terms of amounts borrowed, rather than amounts still owed. 13
G.

Attorney's Fees.

Christian is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
The "gravamen of the dispute," the commercial guaranty upon which ITB sought to recover, is a
commercial transaction within the meaning of the statute.

Bingham v. Montane Resource

Associates, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (Idaho 1999).
13

For the same reasons, decisions dealing with the "single-action rule" also are beside the point. Christian is
not arguing that ITB cannot collect on the guaranty without first foreclosing on the collateral because he is entitled
to the direct benefit of the statutes; rather, because his guaranty liability is expressly limited to amounts the borrower
still "owes or will owe" to ITB, ITB's decision not to foreclose on the collateral eliminated any further liability of
the borrower to ITB, thereby leaving no amounts the borrower "owes or will owe" for Christian to guarantee.
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VI.

Conclusion.

The District Court's ruling is based on its detelmination the Guaranty Agreement
IS

unambiguous and provides for Christian to guarantee the total unpaid loan balance even

though, as a result of ITB's own conduct, there remains no amount the borrower "owes or will
owe." The Court's construction of the Guaranty Agreement:
a. Is contrary to the plain language of the instrument;
b. Extends the guaranty obligation by implication beyond its express limits; and
c. Is premised on ambiguous provisions of the instrument that the District Court
improperly construed in favor of the lender which drafted the Guaranty Agreement.
The District Comi's decision granting ITB's motion for partial summary judgment and denying
Christian's motion for summary judgment should be reversed and remanded with direction to
enter summary judgment for Christian.
Dated this

2~ day of August, 2012.
MARCUS, CHRISTIAN, HARDEE & DAVIES, LLP

By

D~l\~\N\OS\~
Barry Marc
Attorneys for Defendant!Appellant
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